RBN Energy

For most of us, matching spending with income is the logical path to financial stability. However, after decades of aggressive investment in search of growth, the “dollars in equals dollars out” method of allocating free cash flow has been an adjustment for many U.S. oil and gas producers. Their post-pandemic concentration on keeping capital spending well below inflows, maintaining healthy leverage ratios and directing excess funds to reward shareholders with dividends and stock buybacks has revitalized the industry and restored investor confidence. But ebbing commodity prices have upped the difficulty of this quarterly zero-sum game. In today’s RBN blog, we will analyze the shifts detected in Q2 2025 cash allocation of the 38 major U.S. E&Ps we cover. 

Analyst Insights

Analyst Insights are unique perspectives provided by RBN analysts about energy markets developments. The Insights may cover a wide range of information, such as industry trends, fundamentals, competitive landscape, or other market rumblings. These Insights are designed to be bite-size but punchy analysis so that readers can stay abreast of the most important market changes.

By Christine Groenewold - Thursday, 9/04/2025 (2:30 pm)
Report Highlight: U.S. Propane Billboard

The EIA reported total U.S. propane/propylene inventories had a build of 3.2 MMbbl for the week ended August 29, which was more than industry expectations for an increase of 2.1 MMbbl and the average build for the week of 2.4 MMbbl. Total U.S.

By RBN Team - Thursday, 9/04/2025 (2:00 pm)

APA, an E&P with assests in the Permian, Egypt and Suriname among others, recently highlighted significant efficiency gains in the Permian.

Daily Energy Blog

With today’s low crude oil and natural gas prices, the survival of exploration and production companies depends on razor-thin margins. Lease operating expenses––the costs incurred by an operator to keep production flowing after the initial cost of drilling and completing a well have been incurred––are a go-to variable in assessing the financial health of E&Ps. But it’s not enough for investors and analysts to pull LOE line items from Securities and Exchange Commission filings to find the lowest cost producers, plays, or basins. More than ever we need to understand—really, truly, deeply—what LOEs are, why they matter, how they change with commodity prices, production volumes, and other factors, and how we should use them when comparing players and plays. Today we begin a series on a little-explored but important factor in assessing oil and gas production costs.

Forecasting in U.S. energy markets characterized by hair-trigger price volatility, ever-improving well drilling and completion productivity, and the unraveling of old norms is a bit of a high-wire act. But just as big-tent tightrope walkers get better with practice, energy prognosticators can gain from experience––and from taking a look back at previous forecasts to see what they got right, what they may have missed, and what’s changed in the interim. Today we continue our review of a recent presentation at RBN’s School of Energy earlier this month on forecasting lessons learned.

The Shale Revolution changed everything about U.S energy markets, and in the process made forecasting the production and pricing of crude oil, natural gas and NGLs a heck of a lot harder. But we all learn from experience. In the early days of the Revolution, few could have predicted how quickly output would rise, how challenging it would be for pipeline takeaway capacity to keep up with production, or how successfully crude-by-rail would fill the gap – until that gap went away with the Revolution’s most recent phase. Comparing past forecasts to what actually happened is instructive though, and maybe––just maybe––today’s projections for the future are more informed than the forecasts of 2011 or 2013. In today’s blog we look at a recent presentation on forecasting lessons learned at RBN’s School of Energy earlier this month.

Forty years ago, Alaska was seen as the next big thing for U.S. crude oil production––and it was. With the completion of the Trans Alaska Pipeline System in 1977, Alaska North Slope production took off, and by early 1988 it was topping 2 MMb/d and accounting for nearly one-quarter of total U.S. output. But that was the peak; since then, ANS production has fallen steadily, and in August 2016 it averaged only 443 Mb/d, or 5% of the national total. While there is clearly a lot of oil (and natural gas) still in the ground in the North Slope region, developing those resources would be very costly. Today we begin a two-part series on energy production in the 49th state with a look at the oil side of things.

The Army Corps of Engineers is said to be considering alternative routes for the most controversial segment of the Dakota Access Pipeline, which could help break the impasse that has stalled construction on that part of DAPL. If the 450-Mb/d crude oil delivery project gets back on track soon––something that no one knows for sure––an important two-part question remains: Where will the crude to fill the 450-Mb/d pipeline come from, and where will it be fed into DAPL? Today we look at the supply sources that will help fill one of the most important oil pipelines now under development.

Several oil-sands expansion projects committed to when crude oil prices were double what they are today are finally coming online, and midstream companies active in Alberta are building new crude/diluent pipelines and storage capacity to keep pace. New storage caverns for natural gas liquids are also in the works, giving a much-needed boost to Canada’s Energy Province. Today we conclude our series on midstream infrastructure under development in or near Western Canada’s oil sands region that move and store hydrocarbon liquids.

Many factors are weighed before a midstream company commits to building, or a shipper commits to shipping on, a major crude oil pipeline. Where is incremental pipeline capacity needed? What would be the logical origin and terminus for the pipeline? What should the project’s capacity be, and what would be the capital cost of building the project? Where the economic rubber really meets the road is the question of what unit cost––or rate per barrel––would the pipeline developer need to charge to recover its costs and earn a reasonable rate of return on its investment.  A really important aspect of that is what the developer will be allowed to charge, once regulators get into it.   Today we continue our review of crude oil pipeline economics with an overview of who regulates oil pipelines, how they do it, and what it means for rates.

In Part 1 of this series we discussed the fact that new pipeline development is driven by either need or opportunity, and more often than not, a combination of the two. The key question that pipeline developers and their customers (the shippers) have to consider before committing to build new capacity, we said, is whether it will “pay” to flow crude on the pipeline once it’s built––not just the first year or the first three, but for years if not decades to come. To answer this question, pipeline developers and shippers have to consider both current and future economics. There are three fundamental factors that drive pipeline economics: 1) future supply dynamics (and the resulting price impact) at the origination point (Point A); 2) future demand (and price) at the destination point (Point B); and 3) the transportation cost to flow crude from Point A to Point B.  

Oil-sands expansion projects coming online and the resulting need for more diluent are among the drivers behind a number of midstream infrastructure projects in the province of Alberta, including natural gas processing plants and fractionators; oil and diluent pipelines; and oil/NGL storage facilities. The total volume of work is surprising, considering the fact that oil-sands production economics are iffy right now, if not downright upside down. Today, we continue our look at midstream projects under development within Canada’s Energy Province, this time focusing on gas processing and fractionation facilities.

Term charter rates for medium-range Jones Act tankers have fallen by two-thirds since they peaked at $120,000/day in mid-2014, to only $38,000/day done in September 2016, which is good news for producers but a punch in the stomach for ship owners. A sharp rise in the number of vessels being added to the Jones Act fleet has surely contributed to the charter-rate collapse. Less obvious are the degrees to which the rate drop may have been influenced by the decline in superlight Eagle Ford crude oil production, or by the lifting of the ban on U.S. crude oil exports. Today, we examine the evidence.

Many factors are weighed before a midstream company commits to building, or a shipper commits to shipping on, a major crude oil pipeline. Where is incremental pipeline capacity needed? What would be the logical origin and terminus for the pipeline? What should the project’s capacity be, and what would be the capital cost of building the project? Where the economic rubber really meets the road is the question of what unit cost––or rate per barrel––would the pipeline developer need to charge to recover its costs and earn a reasonable rate of return on its investment. Today we continue our review of crude oil pipeline economics with a look at the rules-of-thumb for determining what pipeline transportation rates would be.

The prospects for sellers of Williston Basin/Bakken crude oil in what once was a prime growth market—the U.S. East Coast—have been dwindling fast, as have the volumes of Bakken crude being railed and barged to refineries along the Mid-Atlantic coast and the Canadian Maritimes. Today we look at how a combination of weak crude oil prices, declining production, high relative freight costs, and the lifting of the U.S. crude oil export ban have opened the door to more imports from West Africa, and left Bakken producers out in the cold.

For the first time since the start of the crude-by-rail (CBR) boom a few years ago, just as much crude oil is being transported by rail to PADD 5—that is, to states in the western U.S.—as to the Eastern Seaboard states in PADD 1. This primarily reflects the facts that 1) CBR deliveries from the Williston Basin/Bakken to PADD 1 continue to plummet and 2) refineries in the West remain reliable buyers of railed-in crude from the Bakken and Western Canada. Will CBR shipments to the East Coast continue to fall, or have we seen the worst of the decline? Today we take a look at recent trends in crude movements by tank car, and a look ahead.

More midstream projects than you might expect are “goin’ on” in the Western Canadian province of Alberta, considering the challenges that bitumen/crude oil and natural gas producers there continue to face. There are several drivers behind the relatively long list of oil and diluent pipelines; gas processing plants and fractionators; and oil/NGL storage facilities being built in Canada’s Energy Province, but much of the work is being done to meet the expected needs of oil-sands expansion projects approved during better times and set to come online soon. Today we begin a blog series on Alberta midstream projects with an overview of where the province’s energy sector stands today.

More than four years after the Utica and the “wet” part of the Marcellus became a hot spot for drillers, the field condensate and natural gasoline produced there are still moved to market by barge, rail and truck. A three-part, $500 million plan by MPLX LP and the midstream master limited partnership’s (MLP’s) subsidiaries, now well under way, will enable more efficient pipeline transport of these important hydrocarbons to Midwest refineries, Western Canadian diluent pipelines and other end-users. To hold down costs, the effort involves a creative mix of new and existing pipelines. Today we continue our review of MPLX’s plan with a look at its “Utica Build-Out Projects.”

Net crude oil imports to the U.S. Gulf Coast in 2016 have been running well above the pace set last year, the increase driven by a combination of lower U.S. crude oil production, rising import levels and relatively flat export volumes. The trend toward higher net imports –– an outgrowth of the end of the ban on U.S. crude exports –– is significant in that it affects oil inventories and oil prices. What’s driving this trend, and how soon might net imports peak? Today, we survey recent developments on the crude oil import/export front, with a focus on the Gulf Coast.