Daily Energy Blog

A group of 15 diversified exploration and production companies we have been tracking collectively has slashed capital expenditures by 70% since 2014, but so far the cumulative effect of these spending cuts has been only a 5% decline in production. Now, several of these E&Ps––especially those targeting the Permian Basin and the SCOOP/STACK plays––are planning capex increases and/or expecting production gains. Today we discuss 2016 capital spending and production for a representative group of E&Ps whose operations are roughly balanced between oil and natural gas.

The group of 21 liquids-focused exploration and production companies we have been tracking plans to cut capital expenditures by half in 2016, after a 42% decline in 2015. However, capex for this “oil-weighted” E&P peer group is apparently bottoming out—their mid-year guidance was only 2% lower than their original 2016 estimates. Even with deep cuts in capital spending, the group expects production to fall only 7% in 2016, and those estimates have been revised higher from the initial 2016 guidance.  Also worth noting: Pure Permian Basin players, the most optimistic companies in the peer group, are cutting capital spending by only 19% and are expecting a 12% gain in production.  And with Apache Corp.’s announcement earlier this week of a huge discovery in the Permian’s Southern Delaware Basin, the market is definitely making a turn. Today we discuss 2016 capex and production for a representative group of E&P companies whose proved reserves are more than 60% liquids.

Enable Midstream Partners stands at a crossroads. It has great assets –– natural gas gathering and processing operations in the Anadarko, Arkoma, and Ark-La-Tex basins; a crude oil gathering system in the Williston Basin; and interstate/intrastate gas pipelines that ship natural gas from its gathering regions to the Texas Panhandle and Illinois.  The company also has an excellent position in gathering systems and processing plants in the prolific STACK and SCOOP plays in Oklahoma.  But everything is not rosy.  Earnings from STACK/SCOOP are being offset by production declines in its other areas of operation. On top of that, CenterPoint Energy, which owns 55.4% of Enable’s limited partnership units, is seeking to divest its shares, which would bring a new majority owner into the picture. In today’s blog we review our latest Spotlight analysis.

In their second quarter 2016 earnings announcements, North American exploration and production companies (E&Ps) announced relatively minor changes to the steep reductions in 2016 capital budgets they unveiled around the first of the year. Total 2016 “finding and development” spending for 46 leading U.S. producers was an estimated $41.0 billion, down 51% and 70% from investment in 2015 and 2014, respectively, and slightly lower than the $41.9 billion forecast for 2016 spending in year-end 2015 announcements. The second-quarter reports over the past few weeks also confirmed the initial guidance of a 4% production decline in 2016 after 7% and 6% increases in 2014 and 2015.  However, as we discuss today, a look behind the headline numbers indicates that cuts in capital expenditures (capex) look to have bottomed out, and that the industry may be poised for a turnaround in drilling activity later this year into 2017.

On Friday of last week, two more large E&Ps filed for Chapter 11 – Ultra petroleum with $3.8 billion in unsecured debt and Midstates Petroleum filing with a $2 billion debt-for-equity swap deal.  Over the past 18 months there have been 65 E&P bankruptcies – mostly small companies, but nine companies make up 75% of the $28 billion in total debt exposure of all of these firms.   This chaos in the oil, gas, and NGL markets is having all kinds of financial and strategic ramifications.  One of the consequences of all of the turmoil could be a wave of asset sales, demands for contract restructuring, and more bankruptcy proceedings.  But there can be some real opportunities in all this chaos if you know what to look for, understand where the needs and pitfalls can lie, and especially to recognize that “the sun’ll come up tomorrow.” 

General Partners Phillips 66 and Spectra Energy control midstream Master Limited Partnership (MLP) DCP Midstream Partners (DPM). The partnership owns midstream transportation and processing assets along the natural gas and natural gas liquids (NGL) supply chain. Similar to many MLPs its Limited Partner unit price has declined by more than 50% in the past year. Despite exposure to difficult market conditions in the Eagle Ford and East Texas, a strong performance from the NGL logistics segment is expected to propel a 20% gain in net income between 2015 and 2017. Today we review our latest spotlight analysis report on DPM.

Without the use of corporate structures called Master Limited Partnerships (MLPs) the midstream infrastructure build out that helped make the U.S. shale revolution possible over the past 5 years would have taken far longer to gain traction. MLPs were very successful as the market grew and high prices encouraged new oil and gas production. But along the way some of the businesses these structures were applied to crossed the line from toll-road fee based infrastructure into exposure to commodity prices. For this reason and others, today MLPs are struggling to attract growth capital in a low price environment. Today we conclude our series analyzing the future of MLPs.

For the past decade or more, master limited partnerships (MLPs) have been one of the most popular forms used by energy companies to capitalize themselves and one of the most rewarding for their investors. These investments offered income, in most cases steadily growing, at a time of historically low interest rates.  They also offered capital appreciation as the sector more often than not was one of the best performing in terms of equity returns.  So what explains the rapid collapse in value that has been experienced over the past few months?  Today in Part 2 of RBN’s series on MLPs, we delve further into that question, looking at Incentive Distribution Rights (IDRs) and our friends at Alerian provide a list of 118 MLPs including the “IDR splits”.

It’s hard to imagine how the massive build out of pipelines and processing plants required to deliver shale hydrocarbon production to end use markets in the past 5 years could ever have occurred without the corporate structures known as Master Limited Partnerships (MLP’s). These tax-efficient vehicles financed shale infrastructure by selling partnership units to investors that offered income in the form of cash distributions as well as growth from increasing unit prices. But the leading Alerian AMZ Index of MLP market capitalization fell 46% from August 2014 to December 31, 2015 in the wake of the oil price crash. Today we begin a series looking at past success and future prospects for MLPs.

From waves of reanimated corpses feeding on unfortunate strangers trapped in a western Pennsylvania farmhouse in Night of the Living Dead to the hordes stalking the beleaguered survivors in the current smash TV hit The Walking Dead, zombies have captivated audiences. But real life zombie companies aren’t as entertaining.  The dramatic and sustained plunge in hydrocarbon prices since mid-2014 has ravaged the finances of oil and gas producers to the extent that some observers have labeled the weakest of these “zombie” companies. These cannot sustain themselves on current pretax cash flow and look to be shuffling slowly toward their ultimate demise. Today we take a walk through the living dead to uncover the zombies.

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