Maya

President-elect Trump’s plan to impose a 25% tariff on all imported goods from Canada and Mexico — including crude oil — has raised concern among U.S. refiners, many of which depend heavily on those imports and would face serious challenges in replacing them. The question is, given that dependence and the incoming administration’s pledge to reduce energy costs, will refiners — and oil producers in Canada and Mexico — succeed in their efforts to exempt crude oil from the tariff plan? In today’s RBN blog, we discuss the degree to which U.S. refineries incorporate Canada- and Mexico-sourced oil in their crude slates, the potentially devastating impacts of a tariff on Canadian crude in particular, and the odds for and against U.S. tariffs on oil imports from its neighbors. 

Mexico’s state-owned Petróleos Mexicanos, the second-largest exporter of crude oil to the U.S. after Canada, said in late December that it will slash its export volumes in 2022 and eliminate them completely in 2023. The plan is premised on Pemex’s expectation that, with increased utilization of the company’s six existing refineries and the impending start-up of a new one, it will need every barrel of the Maya, Isthmus, Olmeca, and other varieties of oil it produces. While at first glance it may seem that Mexico phasing out exports of crude would pose a major challenge to some U.S. refineries, there’s good reason to believe that in reality it won’t. In fact, as we discuss in today’s RBN blog, there may be less to Pemex’s planned export phase-out than meets the eye.

Any joint venture has its pros and cons for each party, and in an ideal world, everyone involved in a JV sees net benefits from pairing up with a partner. A quarter-century ago, state-owned Petróleos Mexicanos (Pemex) purchased a 50% stake in Shell’s Deer Park, TX, refinery. The JV partners also entered into a 30-year processing agreement under which each would purchase half of the refinery’s crude feedstock and own half the output. Separately, Pemex agreed to supply as much as 200 Mb/d of Mexico’s heavy sour Maya crude to Deer Park and Shell agreed to supply Pemex with 35-40 Mb/d of gasoline to help meet Mexico’s refined products deficit. The partners recently agreed to an early extension of the deal by 10 years from 2023 to 2033, while reducing the supply of Maya crude after 2023 to 70 Mb/d, to be sold at a fixed price. Today, we continue an analysis of the JV and the new changes to it.

Twenty-five years ago, in 1993, the Mexican national oil company — Petróleos Mexicanos, or Pemex — purchased a 50% stake in Shell’s Deer Park, TX, refinery. The joint-venture partners entered into a 30-year processing agreement under which each would purchase half of the refinery’s crude feedstock and own half the output. Separately, Pemex agreed to supply as much as 200 Mb/d of Mexico’s heavy sour Maya crude to Deer Park and Shell agreed to supply Pemex with 35-40 Mb/d of gasoline to help meet Mexico’s refined products deficit. The partners recently agreed to an early extension of the deal by 10 years from 2023 to 2033, while reducing the supply of Maya crude after 2023 to 70 Mb/d, to be sold at a fixed price. Today, we begin a two-part series on the joint venture with a look at how Pemex has benefitted.

The Permian Basin is awash in light, sweet crude oil that’s cheap to produce and easy to process. It’s so awash, in fact, that supplies are overwhelming takeaway pipeline capacity. The resulting bottleneck in West Texas has cratered prices in Midland, where West Texas Intermediate (WTI) — the region’s light, sweet benchmark — has blown out price-wise against the same grade in other locations, including Houston, with its crude-export docks. Less well known, but influential beyond its geography, is Midland West Texas Sour, or WTS. WTS is suffering from the same wide differentials as WTI at Midland, and those yawning spreads are dragging down the price of Maya, Pemex’s flagship heavy, sour crude. Today, we discuss some surprising ripple effects of takeaway constraints out of the Permian.

Since last winter, the price gap between light crude oil and heavy crude — otherwise known as the light-heavy differential — has narrowed considerably. In February, the price difference between Louisiana Light Sweet crude (LLS) and heavy Maya crude on the Gulf Coast was almost $10/bbl, providing an advantage to refiners who have invested in cokers and other equipment that allows them to run a heavier crude slate. But since June Maya has on average sold for only about $5/bbl less than LLS. Today we examine the shrinking price gap between light and heavy crude and its effect on coking and cracking margins.

A major component of the formula used to set the price of Maya—Mexico’s flagship heavy crude, and a key staple in the diet of many U.S. Gulf Coast refiners—was changed earlier this month, raising new questions about this important price benchmark for nearly all heavy sour crude oil traded along the U.S. Gulf, and points beyond. The change came as Maya production volumes continue to fall, and as Maya is facing increasing competition from Western Canadian Select (diluted bitumen) from Western Canada. Today we conclude a two-part series on Maya crude oil, the new price formula and its potential effects.

Maya, Mexico’s flagship heavy crude, has been a key staple in the diet of U.S. Gulf Coast refiners for a long time, and it has faithfully served as a price benchmark for nearly all heavy crude oil traded along the U.S. Gulf, and points beyond.  Maya’s price, relative to lighter benchmark grades such as Louisiana Light Sweet (LLS) or Brent, provides ready insight into the profitability of heavy oil (coking) refiners. But production of Maya peaked in 2004 and has declined considerably since then, raising questions about its continuing efficacy as a price benchmark. Now it’s come to light that a component of the Maya price formula was changed effective January 1, 2017. Although the change—related to the formula’s fuel oil price component—might be viewed as a relatively minor tweak, it raises new questions about this important heavy oil price benchmark. Today we begin a two-part series on Maya crude, the new price formula and its potential effects.

Mexico’s energy relationship with the U.S. is undergoing radical changes as its oil production sags, its refineries produce too much high-sulfur fuel oil and too little gasoline and diesel, and its imports of U.S. natural gas and transportation fuels rise. Add to this already complicated story the Mexican government’s efforts to inject competition and private-sector participation into a national energy sector long-dominated by state-owned Petróleos Mexicanos (Pemex) and that company’s plan to swap light U.S. crude for heavy Mexican oil. In today’s blog, “With A Little Help From My Friends—Mexico’s Oil Sector in a State of Flux,” Housley Carr begins a look at the ongoing transformation of U.S.-Mexico hydrocarbon trade and what it may mean for U.S. players—and Pemex.

Last Friday (August 14, 2015) the Department of Commerce (DOC) revealed to the press that they would approve a handful of applications to export U.S. domestic light crude to Mexico under a Licensed “swap” arrangement that involves importing the same volume of heavy crude to the U.S. from Mexico. The Licenses are likely to be awarded to Mexican national oil company PEMEX or its affiliates and will last for a year starting at the end of this month (August 2015). Today we update our earlier analysis of Mexican crude swap exports.