It’s been eight weeks since the steady flow of crude oil and refined product tankers out of the Persian Gulf ended, and the impacts on refineries and product suppliers in key parts of the world are becoming clearer. In today’s RBN blog, we discuss the state of refining in the U.S., Europe and the Asia-Pacific region.
The European Union (EU) has taken a number of steps in recent years to end its reliance on Russian natural gas, which accounted for nearly half of the bloc’s supplies before the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. But while the changes happening in Europe might provide a boost for global LNG exporters, including projects in operation or under development in the U.S., the EU’s policy shifts have also introduced greater uncertainty around demand. In today’s RBN blog, we look at the increasing difficulty in predicting EU gas demand and what it means for U.S. exporters and the rest of the global LNG market.
The European Union (EU) has had to rethink and reconfigure major elements of its policies around natural gas since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Prior to the war, Russian volumes accounted for 45% of the EU’s imports of natural gas, nearly double the supply from second-place Norway, but Russian gas supplies have dropped considerably since then, impacting the global LNG market. In today’s RBN blog, we look at the EU’s continued efforts to reduce its reliance on Russia, how it’s trading supply risk for price risk, and what the changes could mean for U.S. LNG exporters.
About 60% of global LNG imports in 2023 came from only three countries — Australia, Qatar and the U.S. — sometimes dubbed the “LNG Trinity.” All three are geographically remote from each other and differ considerably in terms of configuration, politics, economics and strategy. But all three are looking to consolidate and potentially grow their global presence at a time when expectations regarding future LNG demand are evolving and the role of natural gas is shifting to become increasingly complementary to intermittent renewable sources. In today’s RBN blog, we look at the differences within the LNG Trinity and how they may impact — and be impacted by — developments in the global gas market.
LNG commerce is composed of two primary models. One is the traditional point-to-point model, on which the industry was founded and still accounts for more than 60% of LNG trade. More recently, the portfolio model has emerged, pursued by upstream oil and gas majors, that would allow them to monetize their gas reserves by converting them to LNG and shipping the product worldwide in vessels under their control — an attractive strategy that also would allow them to increase their exposure in the LNG market to take advantage of international arbitrage opportunities. As such, they are always long in LNG and in the ships required to move it. However, the portfolio model is being infiltrated by a buyer community looking to become short-side portfolio players and increasingly committing to long-term offtake agreements or FOB sales, then shipping LNG not only to meet their domestic market needs but to take advantage of regional pricing differentials. In today’s RBN blog, we look at the rise of the short-side portfolio player model and ask who might prevail in a potential clash of titans over market share and dominance.
Two maritime passages long regarded as essential shortcuts in the complex world of commodity shipping have become a lot more challenging to navigate. Transiting the Red Sea has turned potentially deadly because of geopolitical tensions, while severe drought has critically reduced operations at the Panama Canal. Combined, these issues are being felt across the energy industry, impacting U.S. and foreign producers and shippers, redrawing trade flows, extending voyage times and, ultimately, raising transportation costs. In today’s RBN blog, we’ll examine and quantify the extra time and costs that shippers of U.S. crude and refined products must bear when using alternative routes.
A year ago, as New Year’s Day approached, we were looking ahead into very uncertain market conditions, having lived through a pandemic, crazy weather events, collapsing and then soaring prices, and Russia’s horrific invasion of Ukraine. Our job was once again to peer into the RBN crystal ball to see what the upcoming year had in store for energy markets. We’ll do that again in our next blog. But another part of that tradition is to look back to see how we did with our forecasts for the previous year. That’s right! We actually check our work. And that’s exactly what we’ll do today: review our prognostications for 2023.
LNG export projects looking to take a positive final investment decision (FID) need to sell a high proportion of their nameplate capacity under long-term contracts to ensure sufficient cash flows to underpin the project and obtain financing. U.S.-based projects (new and expansions) totaling more than 350 million tons per annum (MMtpa, 48.3 Bcf/) — against a current global market of 400 MMtpa (52.9 Bcf/d) — are vying for creditworthy offtakers from multiple markets in their pre-FID deliberations. The sense of urgency among project sponsors has been boosted by the Russia/Ukraine war and a potentially resurgent Chinese economy, both of which should promise a bright future for new projects. Plenty of those have reached FID in the last couple of years, but what is holding others back from taking the same step? In today’s RBN blog, we’ll look at some of the factors impacting those decisions and the long-term implications that flow from them.
Russia supplied significant volumes of crude oil and refined products to Europe for many years. Its primary crude oil export grade, medium-sour Urals (approximately 30 API and 1.7% sulfur), was a benchmark, both in quality and price, that European refiners long relied on to plan refinery processing configurations and that served as a signal for crude oil pricing dynamics in Northwest Europe and the Mediterranean. In addition to crude oil, Russia was a large supplier of gasoil (diesel) as well as a more limited supplier of other refined products such as fuel oil (including intermediate feedstocks) and naphtha. In today’s RBN blog, we review the abrupt reduction in Russian crude oil movements to Europe following Putin’s invasion of Ukraine 13 months ago with an eye on the specific grades that have filled the gap.
From its origins as a specialized energy source sold under long-term, point-to-point contracts to primarily Asian destinations, LNG has become progressively more commodified as its global reach has spread, with 44 countries now importing it. An increasing proportion of cargoes are destination-flexible and can be sent to the market that offers the best price, and the marginal price of LNG is set by supply and demand factors. The spectrum of commercial players has grown and come to resemble more closely the oil market, with not only international oil companies as major participants but also traders and utility buyers, all of whom are contributing to a vibrant international LNG marketplace. But unlike oil and other established commodities, LNG lacks a global reference or benchmark price, and instead is priced regionally, with the divergence in regional market prices giving rise to very profitable arbitrage opportunities for those controlling both product and ships. In today’s RBN blog, we look at the pricing indices used to make LNG trading decisions and two initiatives being implemented by the European Commission (EC) that are intended to improve price transparency for LNG trades and prevent price spikes in European gas markets through a consortium-purchasing approach.
