RINS

Familiar corporate names like Cummins, Freightliner and Waste Management have joined forces with dozens of less-familiar public companies and startups to form what some might call a new U.S. industry. Thousands of commercial trucks powered by compressed natural gas (CNG) are on the roads nationwide, many of them filling up at dedicated fueling stations offering a compressed form of renewable natural gas (RNG), a cellulosic biofuel typically sourced from landfills and dairy farms. In today’s RBN blog, the third and final in our series on the D3 Renewable Identification Number (RIN), we show how this young industry could emerge as a commercial success for cellulosic biofuels, although political and regulatory risk remains. 

The federal Renewable Identification Number (RIN) and California’s Low Carbon Fuel Standard (LCFS) have long served as tools to force renewable fuels like ethanol into the U.S. fuel supply. They are environmental credits that subsidize production of renewable fuels that would not otherwise be economically justified. Nuances embedded in the design of these credit systems have again kicked in to surprise the markets, this time with a hit to renewable diesel (RD) margins. Today’s RBN blog zeroes in on two root causes for that hit. 

How can a business survive and thrive while spending $5.30 to make a product that sells for $1.90? That’s what’s happening in the booming renewable diesel (RD) market, where government subsidies allow RD to compete directly with petroleum diesel even though RD is inherently more costly to produce. But as new plants keep coming on stream, RD profit margins are coming under closer scrutiny. In today’s RBN blog, we analyze RD profit margins and show how they are changing as the market continues to expand. 

The Renewable Identification Number (RIN) has long served as the tool used to force renewable fuels like ethanol and soybean oil into the U.S. gasoline and diesel supply. A creation of the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS), RINs act as a subsidy that enables the production of renewable fuels that would not otherwise be economically justified. RIN prices are set by the usual workings of supply and demand, but chatter has bubbled up recently in the renewable fuels ecosystem that prices for a particular variety of RIN could be headed for a crash. In today’s RBN blog, we explain what’s behind the talk about RIN prices.

The dramatic increase in the price of the D6 Renewable Identification Number a decade ago was one of the more spectacular moves in the history of major commodity trading. The spike in the price of RINs — the credits used to certify compliance with the federal Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) — was brought on by a sudden uptick in demand and stakeholders who lacked sufficiently deep awareness and understanding of the complex RIN credit system. In today’s RBN blog, we use the story of 2013’s “Big Bang” in D6 RIN prices to explain the fundamental mechanism that determines RIN prices, consider whether such a price shock could occur again, and discuss what stakeholders can do to prepare.

Renewable Identification Numbers (RINs) are credits used to certify compliance with the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS), which requires certain minimum volumes of biofuels to be blended into fuels sold in the U.S. There are many types of fuels covered by the RFS and so RIN credits come in different categories. One category, the D6 RIN, applies to the blending of corn-based ethanol into refined gasoline to make the gasoline-ethanol blends we pump into our cars, SUVs and pickups. In 2013, the D6 RIN price skyrocketed 100-fold in one of the most extreme cases of panic buying in any major commodity market in history. In today’s RBN blog, we examine that event and address three key questions: How did it happen, what was the solution, and why does it matter today?

What has been the most controversial topic in the U.S. refining industry over the last 10 years? Well, it’s a matter of opinion but, judging from time spent in earnings conference calls, law offices, courtrooms, congressional committees, the White House, and other forums of business and political debate, Renewable Identification Numbers — or RINs — would have to be a top contender for that prize. In today’s RBN blog and the final episode of this series, we consider two differing viewpoints on the effects of the RIN system and specific disagreements — or are they misunderstandings? — about the financial consequences of RINs that have dominated the debates and legal cases.

Refiners and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) have locked horns in a dispute over Renewable Identification Numbers (RINs). Now in its 10th year, the dispute stems from contradictory premises about how RINs affect the profits of the refiners and blenders who produce the ground transportation fuels sold in the U.S. To form an opinion of what ought to happen next, you need to understand the fundamentals of how RINs work in light of the RIN being a tax and a subsidy that forces renewables into fuels. In today’s RBN blog, we focus on how RINs force renewables into fuels and address the related question: Do RINs increase the price consumers pay for gasoline?

For several years now, no single topic has caused more angst in refiners’ quarterly earnings calls than the seemingly arcane topic of renewable identification numbers, or RINs, which can have a big impact on a refiner’s financial performance. RINs are a feature of the federal Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS), which requires renewable fuels like ethanol and bio-based diesel to be blended into fuels sold in the U.S. And depending on your point of view — farmer, refiner, blender, consumer, politician — you may have a very different perspective regarding RINs’ role as a tax and a subsidy. In today’s RBN blog, we dig into the fundamental aspects of RINs at the root of this long-running controversy and examine the role of RINs as a mechanism for forcing renewables into fuels.

Last month, in the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) latest ruling in a long-running dispute with refiners over the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS), EPA denied 36 petitions from refiners seeking exemptions to their obligation to blend renewables like ethanol into gasoline for the 2018 compliance year. At the core of this dispute are two contradictory premises about Renewable Identification Numbers, or RINs. One premise says the RINs system adds cost that hurts refiners’ profitability, while the other says refiners’ profitability is not affected. Can two seemingly contradictory premises be true? In today’s RBN blog, we begin an examination of the issues surrounding RINs and the degree to which the cost affects refiners’ and blenders’ bottom lines.