recontracting

The U.S. natural gas pipeline sector is entering a challenging period for recontracting a major chunk of its capacity. The numerous pipeline systems built during the early years of the Shale Era’s midstream boom were anchored by 10-year, firm shipper contracts, mostly with producers, making them so-called “supply-push” pipelines. Many of those initial contract periods have begun to roll off, exposing pipelines to producer-shippers’ renewal decisions based on current fundamentals. Shippers typically expect substantially lower rates for a renewal contract, because much of the pipeline has been paid off through depreciation. But there’s another issue that is becoming more important: shipper recontracting may not happen for market reasons. For pipeline owners, this is happening at the worst possible time. The market is in turmoil and facing ongoing uncertainty. Gas production is down, demand from LNG export facilities is in flux, and regional supply-demand dynamics are shifting. As if that weren’t enough, new, large-diameter pipelines out of the Permian now nearing completion will reshuffle gas flows around the country. And other transportation corridors that not long ago were bursting at the seams and feverishly expanding to ease constraints are now at risk of being underutilized. Today, we discuss the factors that together may present significant risk for pipelines approaching the proverbial recontracting “cliff.”

Enbridge’s proposal to have crude oil shippers on its now fully uncommitted Mainline sign long-term contracts for as much as 90% of the 2.9-MMb/d pipeline network’s capacity is a big deal — and controversial. Refiners and integrated producer/refiners generally support the plan, which is now up for consideration by the Canada Energy Regulator, while Western Canadian producers with no refining operations of their own — and, for many, no history of shipping on the Mainline — mostly oppose it. What’s driving their contrasting views? It’s complicated, of course, but what it really comes down to is that everyone wants to avoid what they see as a bad outcome. Refiners and “integrateds” fear that if the current month-to-month approach to pipeline space allocation remains in place, cost-of-service-based tariffs on Mainline will soar when new takeaway capacity is built on the Trans Mountain and Keystone systems and fewer barrels flow on Mainline. Producers, in turn, are wary of making multi-year, take-or-pay commitments to Enbridge if they’ll soon have other takeaway options, and are equally concerned that they’d be left in the lurch if they don’t commit to Mainline and the Trans Mountain Expansion and Keystone XL projects don’t get built. Today, we consider both sides of this important debate.

Up in Canada, there is finally a regulatory timeline for reviewing Enbridge’s long-standing proposal to revamp how it allocates space — and charges for service — on the company’s 2.9-MMb/d Mainline. But the plan to convert the largest crude oil pipeline system out of Western Canada from one whose space is 100% uncommitted and allocated every month to one with 90% of its capacity locked in via long-term contracts remains controversial, especially among producers. Plus, the world has changed in the past few months. Oil sands and other production in Alberta and its provincial neighbors is off sharply in response to pandemic-related demand destruction and low oil prices, and the always-full Mainline has been running at well under 90% of its capacity lately. Further, the Trans Mountain Expansion and Keystone XL projects — competitors to the Mainline in a way — have progressed this year, making shippers wonder whether to lock in capacity on the Mainline if TMX and KXL’s completion may be imminent. Today, we begin a short series on the prospective shift to a contract-carriage approach on the primary conduit for heavy and light crudes from Western Canada to U.S. crude hubs and refineries.